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Chenhall and Moers (2006) provide an excellent overview of the 
econometrics of endogeneity. In response to their discussion I argue that 
researchers should be courageous enough to set aside endogeneity concerns 
when their research question is important. Theory does not admit a definite 
answer to the question whether endogeneity is present in a particular model 
and econometrics has few technical solutions to offer. Since we cannot be 
sure endogeneity exists, and if we were to be sure of its existence, there is 
little we can do about it, researchers are well advised to move on to more 
serious problems.    
 
1.  Introduction 
I am sure many Soviet apparatchiks wholly agreed with Pravda’s October 1986 
editorial comment on pop music that “Rock and Roll has a right to exist but only if it is 
melodious, meaningful, and well performed.” Much to the chagrin of these Party fuddy-
duddies, however, often the more interesting music is pounding, rhythmic, devoid of 
meaning, and edgy. As in music, so in empirical accounting research: While some might 
take the position that accounting research should be based on fully developed theoretical 
arguments, sophisticated econometrics, and complete data sets, perhaps the most 
revealing studies in (management) accounting explore areas in which theory offers 
contradictory predictions, measurement instruments are underdeveloped, and available 
data do not admit advanced statistical procedures. Indeed, empirical research in 
accounting should be driven not  by the degree to which smooth theory, elegant 
techniques, or computer-friendly data are convenient or available, but rather by important 
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  1questions about human behavior in organizations and markets, as asking important 
questions is perhaps the most crucial step in any research project. Then, having identified 
their questions, conscientious empirical researchers should turn to the effort of answering 
their questions by using theory to develop hypotheses and collecting data to test their 
hypotheses.  
Perhaps more so in management accounting than in other areas of accounting, 
these well-known stages of the research cycle are fraught with potential problems. For 
instance, theory is often non-existent or its assumptions are too strong to admit 
application, samples are often small and non-random, constructs are not always measured 
in a reliable and valid fashion, and finding data with which one can confront theory is 
frequently a formidable obstacle. And of course, endogeneity  may also be an issue. 
Conducting empirical work involves weighing each of these considerations against the 
others, evaluating what can be done to address the problems associated with theory, data, 
instruments, and endogeneity and then deciding whether the required investments to 
solve these problems pay off sufficiently. Given the plentitude of issues competing for 
the researcher’s attention, endogeneity might just well be a low-ranking priority. Why?  
First, in practice there is little that can be done about endogeneity. The textbook 
solutions typically recommend using instrumental variable (IV) estimation, employing a 
proxy that is not “endogenous” but is highly correlated with the structural variable of 
interest, or collecting additional data that allow for the use of panel data techniques. 
However, valid instruments are the closest thing to the “holy grail” in accounting 
research, as they are highly desirable but illusive (Larcker and Rusticus 2005), proxies 
are likely to be imperfect (i.e., correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables in 
  2the structural equation), and additional data that meet the requirements of panel data 
techniques are often hard to obtain in management accounting settings.  
Second, while invoking theory is often the remedy advocated as a panacea for 
endogeneity, to date the field of management accounting does not boast one unifying 
theory, that is, a dominant theoretical perspective or way of analyzing management 
accounting problems, that is generally accepted by researchers, and in many sub-fields 
the extant theory is only in its nascent stages, inherently incomplete and deeply contested. 
One only has to read the discussion between Zimmerman (2001) and Hopwood (2002) to 
understand how problematic it is to talk about theory in management accounting. As 
such, a researcher can probably find one “theory” to argue that a model suffers from 
endogeneity and another “theory” to argue the opposite. Given these circumstances, there 
is a real danger that using theory to justify the designation of certain variables as 
endogenous or exogenous amounts to little more than post-hoc rationalization of research 
design choices.   
Nevertheless, theoretical developments in the economics of organization have 
made endogeneity a more prominent issue in managerial accounting. In the remainder of 
this comment I briefly discuss these advances. I describe endogeneity as a specification 
problem in a regression framework and I offer a way of thinking about endogeneity that 
may be helpful to empirical researchers. I then argue that even in light of these advances, 
endogeneity is not likely to be resolved, and thus empirical research should benefit most 
from putting endogeneity issues to the side and moving on to more serious problems.   
2.  Theory and the heightened awareness about endogeneity 
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should be estimated. Focusing on the estimation consequences of endogeneity implies an 
econometric definition of the problem. Accordingly, many econometrics textbooks offer 
a definition of endogeneity that concentrates on the (non-zero) correlation between the 
error term in the structural equation and any explanatory variables. While it is 
mathematically trivial to demonstrate a bias in estimators when the orthogonality 
condition between structural disturbances and explanatory variables is not fulfilled, 
identifying such a bias does not further our understanding of endogeneity.  Indeed, 
crucial questions remain unanswered. For instance, what is the source of the bias, what is 
the substantive meaning of the correlation between the error term and the independent 
variables, and when is it innocuous to assume orthogonality? Without clarifying the 
economic or theoretical rationale implied by the orthogonality condition, endogeneity is 
likely to be considered an arcane, technical concern of little significance to empirical 
researchers. 
 A more intuitive definition of endogeneity is suggested by considering the actual 
practice of empirical research. Empiricists try to identify causal effects, which is done by 
measuring the effect of certain causes while holding all other causes in the model 
constant. Elsewhere I propose that one can follow Heckman (2000) and think of 
endogeneity as the case in which the ceteris paribus condition is not fulfilled whenever 
the relation of interest is examined (Nikolaev and van Lent 2005). Establishing whether 
the ceteris paribus condition holds is not clear-cut, however, especially when the causes 
cannot be independently varied. For instance, ceteris paribus is too strong an assumption 
when simultaneity or omitted variables are present. Consider the following two examples.  
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manager’s leadership style and the investment opportunity set of the division. The 
hypothesis is that more open, democratic, and empathizing division managers will be 
more effective in encouraging their employees to find new, profitable investments.  Yet, 
it may be the case that corporate headquarters put managers with an open, democratic 
style in charge of divisions with growth opportunities. If so, then examining the effect of 
leadership style on a division’s investment opportunity set does not fulfill the ceteris 
paribus condition because variations in investment opportunities will immediately feed 
back to the leadership style of the division managers.    
Consider next the case in which you are interested in the effect of establishing 
inter-firm networks or alliances on financial performance. The idea is that firms reap 
efficiency gains and other benefits from becoming a network partner and such firms are 
significantly more profitable than non-network firms. Suppose the researcher omits from 
his model the variable “market competition.” Because firms in a very competitive market 
tend to observe lower economic performance and thus, in an effort to cope with 
competitive pressures, they are likely to form alliances, we cannot examine the effect of 
varying “networks” on “financial performance” as it is unreasonable to assume that 
“market competition” is unrelated with “networks.” Therefore, when causes are 
interrelated, establishing the causal effect of one, holding everything else equal, is a 
difficult feat.    
Econometricians advise the researcher to apply introspection (Wooldridge 2002) 
to assess whether endogeneity affects a model’s estimation or to convince peer reviewers 
that the model is “reasonable” (Greene 2000; Kennedy 2003).  Introspection renders 
  5endogeneity a subjective matter.  It also may explain at least in part the growing 
awareness of endogeneity in management accounting research, as peers routinely rely on 
prior research to evaluate whether they think a model is reasonable.  
Since the early 1990s, theoretical work on the economics of organizations has 
been increasingly insistent about the need to think of firms as systems of interrelated 
attributes (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Smith and Watts 1992; Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1994; Milgrom and Roberts 1995; Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman 2001). The major 
innovation in this line of inquiry is that the economic analysis of organizations does no 
longer require that a model’s problem have “well-behaved” features such as smoothly 
concave objective functions and convex choice sets to conduct comparative statics. As 
Roberts (2004) points out, there is no reason to believe that these traditional conditions 
hold when analyzing organizational design problems. For example, increasing returns to 
scale, learning effects, and indivisibilities are all incompatible with concave objective 
functions. New methods of comparative statics allow economists to deal with large 
numbers of choice variables without assuming concave objective functions. Instead, the 
key assumption is that the choice variables interact. In the context of organizational 
design, choices, or attributes, such as a firm’s strategy and structure are assumed to be 
linked to one another and in turn to change together in response to an environmental 
change. Because some organization design choices work best in concert with other 
choices (i.e., are complementary), “coherent clusters” emerge. For example, a make-to-
order strategy complements both extensive communication between the Sales and 
Manufacturing departments and management accounting systems that support lateral 
flows of information (Bouwens and Abernethy 2000). Hence, we should observe these 
  6organizational design choices together, and, as a consequence, it makes little sense to 
model one choice as the causal determinant of the other.
1   
From the above discussion, it is quite easy to understand why endogeneity has 
increasingly become an issue in applied work. Recall that endogeneity problems are said 
to exist if the ceteris paribus condition does not hold. To the extent that 
complementarities underlie organizational design choices, it is unreasonable to consider 
the relation between two choices within a coherent cluster in isolation, holding all other 
choices constant. Similarly, one cannot conclude causality if we observe covariance 
across clusters of choices (since clusters are likely to respond to a third, exogenous 
factor). Ideally, therefore, empirical researchers should explore the interactions among all 
the choice variables that make up a coherent cluster and document how different clusters 
of choices influence outcomes. However, given the econometric problems with 
implementing such a research design, it is unreasonable to expect that this can actually be 
done.  
Partial relief may come from the growing evidence that some elements of 
organizational design are “slow moving,” such as the assignment of decision rights 
within firms (Abernethy and Lillis 2001; Nagar 2002; Abernethy, Bouwens, and van Lent 
2004), whereas others can be more easily adapted to environmental and strategic changes. 
Firms use strategy and the more malleable elements of formal design, e.g., performance 
measurement and the information system, to respond to changes in markets or technology 
(Roberts 2004; Bouwens and van Lent 2006). Thus, while the elements of an 
organization’s design will interact, it is likely that the impact of the malleable elements 
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  7on the inert elements is of second-order importance. This should allay endogeneity 
concerns researchers have when using slow-moving elements of an organization’s design 
as explanatory variables in regressions. 
However important these theoretical developments may be, they are of limited use 
to management accounting researchers in practice—at least when it comes to “solving” 
the endogeneity problem. In essence, exhortations to incorporate relevant theory are 
somewhat disingenuous because we “have a lot of theory, by social science standards, but 
[we] still run a substantial deficit in degrees of freedom” (Bartels 1990). Simply put, 
theory is just not specific enough to ensure whether endogeneity is present or absent in a 
given context and I doubt whether theory will ever achieve a level of development in 
which it will admit unequivocal judgment on this question. No wonder some 
econometricians have near-existentialist doubts about what can be learned from the data 
we collect:  
  “There is little question that the absence of completely defined models 
impinges seriously on the usefulness of data in economics. On 
pessimistic days I doubt that economists have learned anything from the 
mountains of computer print-outs that fill their offices. On especially 
pessimistic days, I doubt that they ever will. But there are optimistic 
days as well.” (Leamer 1983, p. 325) 
In sum, theory will not solve the endogeneity problem. At best, it will cast 
suspicion on certain specifications and will question whether some variables can be 
analyzed without modeling their effects on other variables as well. Yet, any such 
suspicion is rather unhelpful since theory is unlikely to provide convincing evidence that 
endogeneity does indeed affect the analysis.  
3.  Endogeneity as a regression specification problem. 
  8Suppose you accept that theory in the field of management accounting is too 
incomplete, contested, and underdeveloped to offer certainty about the correct 
specification of the structural model of interest, which, after all, is supposed to be the 
formal reflection of theory. The next mental step will then be easy to take: If we are 
unsure about what the true structural model is, it is a bit silly to expend much effort 
worrying about the (endogeneity bias in) particular  parameter values of whatever 
empirical translation of the structural model we happen to be estimating. That is, 
theoretical uncertainty must lead to uncertainty about the structural model. And if 
researchers are uncertain about the structural model (in the case of management 
accounting, they should be), then they need to investigate plausible alternative 
specifications and report how inferences change with these specifications. Sensitivity 
analyses are currently mostly presented as checks on empirical, operational choices. For 
instance, researchers compare the behavior of one proxy variable with another, or they 
show how the results of maximum likelihood estimation differ from those of generalized 
method of moments. Far less often, however, do researchers reports sensitivity analyses 
that explore different plausible specifications of the structural model.
2 Much can be 
learned by showing that several plausible structural models produce similar results or by 
discussing how seemingly small changes in the specification of a structural model lead to 
substantively different conclusions (Bartels 1990).
3  
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unwieldy papers and unhappy editors. Perhaps even more importantly, it will bore readers 
to death. With respect to the former, the best way to keep the length of papers in check 
while acknowledging theoretical uncertainty is to distinguish between two sets of 
variables, namely, those we care about and those we include in the structural model as 
controls (Nikolaev and van Lent 2005). Then, because the goal of most researchers is 
usually not to pin down the exact, true specification of the structural model, but rather to 
learn about the relations among a limited set of key variables, we can relay concerns 
about the potential endogeneity among the other variables in the “Limitations and future 
research” section of the paper, reserving specification-robustness tests to the key 
variables.
4   
With respect to not distracting readers to the point of boredom, my perception is 
that many readers currently skip the “sensitivity section” in papers because it usually 
does not provide any new information. Typically, authors report that they have done 
many things, but whatever they did, “results remained qualitatively unchanged.” That the 
results do not change in the robustness checks in most papers has less to do with the 
soundness of the research as with self selection. If authors cannot show that results 
remain “qualitatively unchanged,” reviewers and editors tend to take that as their cue to 
reject the paper. I feel it is time to change this practice and ensure that the sensitivity 
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pressed to try something different until results change significantly. By reporting what 
plausible alternative specification of the structural model yields different results, we start 
to appreciate much better what exactly the limits of our knowledge are. Suppose a 
researcher believes “decentralization” is positively associated with the “use of non-
financial measures.” She finds support for this relation in several plausible alternative 
structural models, but when she adds “information asymmetry” as an additional 
explanatory factor among the non-financial measures, its association with 
decentralization disappears. Should this be a reason to reject the paper? Scientific 
progress is probably better served by reporting the result and leaving the matter to future 
research, as the finding suggests the need for further exploration of the role of 
information asymmetry and its relation with both decentralization and the use of non-
financial measures. What’s more, surprising outcomes from these sensitivity tests may be 
sufficiently interesting to warrant publication. It will take courageous authors, reviewers, 
and editors to implement this suggestion. But given the aims and scope of European 
Accounting Review, I think this journal can be a good place to start.  
4.  Concluding remarks 
Whereas many in the Communist Party publicly supported the party stance on 
rock music, a good number of them also enjoyed listening to it in private, especially if it 
was not “melodious, meaningful, or well performed.” Many empirical researchers will 
publicly agree that endogeneity is an important issue. The most confident among them, 
however, will ignore it—without worries—in their own research. 
  11    Theory in (management) accounting is neither strong nor unified enough to 
solve the endogeneity problem. And most likely it never will be. Further, econometrics 
does not offer any practical solutions to endogeneity bias. Given that we can never be 
(theoretically) sure endogeneity exists, and if we were to be sure of its existence, there is 
little we can do about it from a practical standpoint, does it make sense to worry about 
endogeneity? My answer is that we shouldn’t expend great effort worrying about 
endogeneity, but we shouldn’t fully ignore it either. Researchers need to consider 
endogeneity upfront and evaluate whether their research question is interesting or 
provoking even in the presence of potential endogeneity issues. Because endogeneity is 
just one dimension on which to judge the value of research, it may often be appropriate to 
disregard it to stimulate academic discussion or to initiate more research in a particular 
area. At the same time, researchers need to be careful about how they construe their 
results and should discuss alternative interpretations. Such a discussion should indicate 
how endogeneity is expected to affect parameter estimates (direction, size of the bias) as 
well as acknowledge the fact that in the absence of a true structural model (or a true 
theory), in all likelihood the model under consideration is misspecified. Pretending to 
know everything about the structural model’s specification, while being ignorant about 
parameter values, is an untenable position (Bartels 1990). If we are always dealing with 
misspecified models, then it is the duty of conscientious empirical researchers to defend 
how they choose between alternative misspecified models (Leamer 1978; Bartels 1985). 
Importantly, authors should also show how results change when plausible alternative 
specifications of the structural model are used and such changes should be interpreted as 
an indication of the soundness, not the weakness, of the research design. 
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understanding about (the econometrics of) endogeneity. A potentially sobering note 
comes, however, from an experiment carried out by Donald Green, who asked a group of 
master students to each develop a regression model (choosing between just three potential 
independent variables) and estimate parameters using purpose-simulated data. He finds 
that the observed variability of the parameter estimates greatly exceeds what one would 
expect based on sampling error alone. What is particularly worrying though is that 
students who were told that one should specify models in a theoretically sensible way, 
but whose training also emphasized statistical testing theory and econometrics, were 
more likely to misspecify their models by including endogenous regressors and excluding 
causally relevant but statistically insignificant variables (Green 1990). Let’s hope that 
learning more about the econometrics of endogeneity does not cause management 
accounting researchers to abandon common sense. 
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